I. INTRODUCTION
. 4 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 259 (July 8). In this important opinion, the Court cites several of the numerous statements advanced by States for the conclusion that the law of armed conflict applies to nuclear weapons whether nuclear weapons were in existence at the time the law developed or not. Two relevant points arise from this discussion. First, as the Court quotes from the representative statements of States, the following phrases are used and are assumed by the court to be synonymous: 'international humanitarian law' (New Zealand), 'rules applicable to armed conflict' (Russian Federation), 'jus in bello' (United Kingdom), and 'law of armed conflict' (United States). Second, as the noted quotation above makes clear, the court's conclusion that humanitarian law applies to nuclear weapons is equally applicable to any 'past ... present and ... future' forms of warfare and kinds of weapons. This statement certainly provides the International Court of Justice's answer to the question of whether the law of war will apply to space warfare. 5 It is a goal of the United States to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, including one or an adequate additional number of anti-ballistic missile sites and space-based sensors, that is capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against limited attacks of ballistic missiles.
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Four years later, in 1995, a bill was introduced in Congress entitled the Defend America Act. 12 Section 4 of that instrument provided that, within one year of its enactment, there should be at least one test of either an ABM interceptor based in space; a sensor in space capable of providing data directly to an ABM interceptor; or an existing air defence, theatre missile defence, or early warning system, so as to demonstrate the country's capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. 13 In the same year, an almost identical provision was inserted into the Ballistic Missile Defense Act. 14 The legislation sought to allow deployment of multiple ground-based ABM sites to provide effective defence of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack; unrestricted use of sensors based within the atmosphere and in space; and increased flexibility for development, testing, and deployment of follow-on national missile defence systems. With the introduction of these initiatives, the future of the ABM Treaty was doomed, since it purported to restrain these emerging military and technological goals.
Since the 2001 decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the United States has been actively pursuing innovative military technology that it considers as essential to its decision to not only establish a national missile shield system, but to also locate important elements of the same in strategic locations overseas. This strategy has lead to a chorus of protests, particularly from the United States' principal military competitors, Russia and China. These protests have reached a heightened crescendo, specifically from the former, as a consequence of the decision by the United States in 2006 to locate parts of the system in the former communist 11 Id. at § 232 (a) (1). 12 Defend America Act of 1995, H.R. 2483, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995). 13 Id. at § 4. 14 National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104-406 to accompany H.R. 1530, 104th Cong. §235 (1995) , available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1995_r/h104406.htm.
bloc countries of Poland and the Czech Republic, following detailed bilateral talks with those two countries.
The proposed United States ballistic missile defence shield system would involve the deployment of space-based sensors, including a space and missile tracking system and other space-based sensors which could provide cueing to the ground-based interceptors. 15 The decision to locate interceptor missiles in Poland and associated radar systems and infrastructure in the Czech Republic 16 incensed Russia, leading to a stream of caustic and even inflammatory public comments. Seemingly fearful that the system may eventually lead to neutralization of its own strategic missiles, Russia has indicated that it may consider freezing its commitments to several arms reduction treaties, including the 1988 Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty (CFE Treaty), setting the stage for a potential arms race.
At the same time, China has been rapidly consolidating its status as a space power, racheting up the stakes very significantly with the test of an anti-satellite weapon. In January 2007, the Chinese military launched a KT-1 rocket that successfully destroyed a redundant Chinese
Feng Yun 1-C weather satellite, which it had launched in 1999, in Low Earth Orbit approximately 800 kilometres above the earth. This generated a great deal of alarm and unease in Washington and elsewhere, particularly as it indicated quite starkly the increasing technological capabilities of the Chinese military. 17 With China predicted to become the ascendant 'superpower' in the twenty-first century, this space-technology rivalry (particularly 15 Id. 16 20 Id. 21 In 1998, the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) published its Long Range Plan outlining the United States military vision for control of space and developing a capacity to project force from space. The first two mission statements of USSpacecom's Vision For 2020 are pointed: "space support" and "force enhancement" meaning the use of space assets to facilitate military operations of combat forces on land, sea, and air. The next two mission statements: "space control" and "force application" are more controversial as they suggest the weaponization of space, and are most closely related to combat in a future theatre of military space operations. Overall these four mission areas encapsulate 'space control'. U. S. SPACE COMMAND, LONG RANGE PLAN, USSpacecom Vision For 2020 (1998). Even more significant was another document issued in 1999 by United States Department of Defence ('DoD'), which expanded upon, and reinforced themes raised by USSpacecom's Vision For 2020 Among other space issues, the DoD policy states: "Purposeful interference with US space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The US may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including, if directed by the National Command Authorities ('NCA'), the use of force, to respond to such an infringement on US rights". DEP'T OF DEF., Directive Number 3100.10 § 4.2.1 (1999 The 'laws and customs of war' had its origins in the customary practices of armies on the battlefield and has developed as an important branch of international law. 41 The application of these customary practices was not uniform, 42 and it therefore became evident that more formalized standards were required. A major step forward in the development of the rules of war, which inter alia limit the method and means of conducting warfare and also provide for Convention and the 1907 Fourth Convention. 53 The clause was intended to supplement the prohibitory rules adopted at both conferences. The clause appears (in slightly differing versions) in several laws of war documents, and generally provides as follows:
II. CUSTOMARY AND CONVENTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF WAR
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. Charter was important, given that the maintenance of international peace and security is the underlying principle of the system established under that instrument. 106 The prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter represents a crucial element in the regulation of international relations and is equally applicable to the use of outer space.
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On the other hand, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter -which confirms the 'inherent right' of self-defence 'if an armed attack occurs'-is also applicable to the legal regulation of outer space. 108 Under the principles of public international law, this right of self-defence remains subject to express legal limitations -the requirements of necessity and proportionality. 109 In
its Advisory Opinion in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the International Court of Justice observed: 'The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law'. 110 Moreover, even where the right of self-defence is lawfully exercised, the State acting in self-defence remains subject to the jus in bello principles described above. 111 The sentiments encapsulated in the United Nations Charter were strengthened further by the restrictions imposed in relation to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction by
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, although, as has been well documented by leading commentators, this provision in and of itself does not represent a complete restriction on the placement of weapons in outer space. 112 Indeed, there have been, from time to time, proposals put forward to amend Article IV in order to enhance these restrictions, but this has not (yet) eventuated. 113 The 'peaceful purposes' provision set out in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty has been the subject of much analytical discussion as to its scope and meaning. While there is general agreement -but not complete unanimity -among space law commentators that this is directed against "non-military" rather than merely "non-aggressive" activities, the reality has, unfortunately, been different. 114 It is undeniable that, in addition to the many commercial and scientific uses, outer space has and continues to be used for an expanding array of military activities. 115 Unless concrete steps are taken to arrest this trend -which will require a significant shift in political will, particularly among the major powers of the world -it is likely that space will increasingly be utilized to further the military and strategic aims of specific countries, particularly as military and space technology continues to evolve and develop.
In this context, if one were to adopt a hard-line pragmatic (and non-legal) view of the current situation, one could suggest that the 'non-military v. non-aggressive' debate is a redundant argument, even though it represents an extremely important issue of interpretation of the strict principles set out in the Outer Space Treaty. Indeed, the focus of much discussion now centres (as it should) on issues involving the "weaponization" of space -witness the numerous space. 119 However, as an integral part of international law, the principles of international humanitarian law, are also highly relevant to the military uses of outer space. There is no specific 'territorial' limitation to the application of the jus in bello principles. The laws and customs of war apply both to the area where the hostilities actually take place, as well as the broader areas that are in some way affected by the hostilities. 120 If, for example, direct military action takes place in one area, but the effects of that action impact on civilians
elsewhere, that represents a relevant consideration in deciding whether such action is consistent with the rules of war -for example with the principle of proportionality. 121 As a consequence, any military activity that takes place in outer space will be subject to the jus in bello in relation not only to the direct action, but also as to its effects elsewhere, including on Earth.
Having established that these principles can apply to outer space, it is necessary to determine whether this is just an issue of academic curiosity or whether the rules of war are "relevant" to activities in outer space. The answer, unfortunately, appears to be self-evident, as is clearly illustrated by the developments outlined earlier in this article. It seems that outer space may well become a theatre of war in the future.
It was during the Gulf War in 1990 that the value of space assets to the conduct of war was first utilised to a significant degree -indeed, 'Operation Desert Storm' was regarded as 'the first space war'. 122 Let us assume, for example, that a combatant takes the view that a dual-use satellite, for example, a communications satellite, represents a legitimate military objective in accordance with the principles outlined above. Even if this were a correct assessment, the principle of proportionality would continue to apply, so that injury and damage to civilians and civilian property should not be disproportionate to any expected military advantage. Moreover, one could argue that implicit in the principle of distinction is the obligation on the parties to a conflict to take 'all feasible precautions' to protect civilians from the effects of an attack.
139 137 See id. at 201. 138 U. N. Charter art. 51. 139 HECKAERTS ET. AL., supra note 41, at 70. There would also be adverse environmental consequences (including significant space debris) that may result from the destruction of a satellite. There are, of course, international environmental law principles that would also be applicable in these circumstances.
One can certainly envision that the deliberate destruction of such a target, even if it does not result in any immediate civilian casualties, would have a devastating impact on a community, country or even a region of the world. Millions of lives and livelihoods could potentially be affected, economies destroyed and essential services incapacitated. Obviously, some of the consequences of such an attack may be difficult to foresee, but such action would, one could argue, be regarded at least as reckless. However, there are uncertainties as to whether a 'recklessness' test is applicable in the determination of the proportionality principle. 140 Given the unique nature of outer space, the principles under the jus in bello, developed as they were largely to regulate terrestrial warfare and armed conflict, are probably neither sufficiently specific nor entirely appropriate to military action in outer space. Even though every effort should be made to define the existing principles as clearly as possible, the looseness of some of the fundamental concepts, as well as the resistance they face from certain States, 141 means that more specific rules are required if they are to provide a comprehensive framework to protect outer space from becoming another theatre of warfare.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF LAWS OF WAR WITH SPACE WEAPONRY Electromagnetic and Radiation Weapons
The quintessential electromagnetic and radiation weapon is the nuclear bomb. when combined, these innovations will allow for the projection of extremely high power densities, including electromagnetic radiation, over extremely long distances to land, air, and space-based targets. 159 As an example, the report suggests that such a weapon in the geosynchronous orbit could create a six mile footprint on a battlefield which would "blank out" all radar receivers and would damage all unprotected communication sets within that area. 160 The tremendous power envisioned would also allow injection of signals into even heavily shielded communications networks, allowing for information warfare to be waged at will.
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156 Because the Outer Space Treaty does not define "nuclear weapon" its prohibition has stimulated debate over newer technologies such as the X-ray laser which is powered by a nuclear explosion. Whether a nuclear-powered laser is a nuclear weapon will indicate whether it is lawful for it to orbit the earth or not. P. Jankowitsch, Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE, 147 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., Praeger Publishers 1992). Given its destructive power, the military significance of such a laser will be tremendous. For example, the intense X-rays emitted as a result of the initial nuclear blast lead some to speculate that one X-ray laser no larger than a packing crate would be able to destroy the entire Russian ICBM arsenal if they were launched at one time in a massive attack. 
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW)
Directed Energy Weapons 'include laser, and radio frequency' weapons. 173 A laser weapon produces an intense beam. 174 Laser weapons can be used to either physically harm the satellite or simply to 'blind' a satellite's sensors. 175 The study of laser weapons, including those immunity. . . . The opposing belligerent will owe no greater duty to return the prisoner of war from space than it would the prisoner of war from the land, sea, or air.
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V. CONCLUSION
Consideration of technologies useful for space combat will proceed under the principle that State action is permitted in the absence of clear legal prohibition. 209 Though regularly denounced by a large segment of the international community as destabilizing for the use and exploration of outer space, 210 in principle none of the potential means and methods of space warfare, with the exception of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, violate international law. 211 Of course, the use to which these weapons are put might render them unlawful for a specific objective if, for example, their use rendered them disproportionate (or indiscriminate or inhumane) under the laws of war as judged against the military objective in view. But this is an inherent possibility for any weapon, which, by itself, does not render the weapon unlawful. In the words of Colleen D Sullivan:
Although the role of custom in the development of modern international law has evolved, it is still a valid and important source of modern law. What is different, however, is that in an era of sophisticated satellite communications, the development of customary legal principles has become an accelerated process rather than a gradual evolution. In addition, the growing significance of international governmental organizations with their plenary decision-making process, often by consensus, has created a procedure by which custom can coalesce into customary principle and develop into codified law within a relatively short period of time.
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So important are space systems to military operations that it is unrealistic to imagine that they will never become military targets. Just as land dominance, sea control, and air superiority have become critical elements of current military strategy, space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield success and future warfare…An increased dependence on space capabilities may lead to increased vulnerabilities. As space systems become lucrative military targets, there will be a critical need to control the ways in which space is utilized in future armed conflicts.
Although the existing jus in bello principles, which also apply to outer space, provide some underlying standards that regulate the utilization of space for the purposes of armed conflict, the unique nature of space requires that the applicable rules be strengthened and particularized towards the environment of space. to ban the use and testing of certain types of weapons, there are many uncertainties that arise when one seeks to apply these principles to a (at this stage hypothetical) space conflict. The consequences of a space war are potentially so enormous that one cannot be sure as to exactly how these rules -for example, the principle of proportionality -will apply.
In doing so, if we are to avoid 'grey areas' in the law, it is necessary to develop specific and should be definitively resolved so as to counter any arguments that outer space is, in fact, an area akin to the territory of a State for the purposes of national security. Even more significantly, in developing these new rules, we need to adhere strictly to the 'collective humanity' principles inherent in both the jus in bello and the international law of outer space in order to avoid the possibility of alternate scenarios too frightening to contemplate.
